Puede ser que haya un Islam liberal. Después de todo el Islamismo o Islamofascismo no es una religión sino una ideologís basada en una religión para combatir a Occidente.El problema es que estos extremistas chantajean al resto de los musulmanes. De todas maneras, la falta de convicción de Europa para defender a su civilización más el indiscutible y creciente desbalance demográfico en favor de los musulmanes invita a ser pesimista. Frente a la barbarie medieval del islamismo por el momento sólo quedan EEUU e Israel (En menor medida Australia y otros países). La semana pasada les envié un artículo del gran historiador militar británico John Keegan que sostiene que otra guerra en el Líbano es inevitable y llega a vaticinar que es probable que antes de fin de año Israel tenga que golpear a Hezbollah en el Sur del Líbano. Quiero transcribir también un artículo de hoy en Frontpage Magazine en el que Olivier Guitta dice que la UNIFIL se limita a ver como Hezbollah se rearma impunemete, por ello también sostiene que otra guerra es inevitable
Transcribo los dos artículos
Countdown to Conflict By Olivier Guitta FrontPageMagazine.com | November 22, 2006
In the wake of this summer’s bloody, 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel, most analysts predicted that the region would never be the same. In fact, they asserted that with UN Resolution 1701, Hezbollah would be disarmed and expelled from its redoubt in southern Lebanon. This in turn would give effective control of the region to the Lebanese Army, while a UNIFIL force 15,000-men strong would secure the cease-fire and put an end to the armed conflict.
But the present reality is far from this rosy picture. Indeed, one can make the case that this summer’s hostilities have achieved little and that another war will resume in the near future.
A few prescient facts confirm this grim assessment. First, there is the anti-Israel composition of the Lebanese army. Forty percent of the 60,000-strong Lebanese army is composed of Shiite soldiers, many whom are extremely favorable to Hezbollah. There are also thousands of ex-Syrian troops, who joined the Lebanese Army when Syria “officially” left Lebanon last year, just before the Syrian withdrawal, when thousands of Syrian soldiers were naturalized and incorporated into the ranks of the army.
UNIFIL is scarcely an improvement. On the contrary, it is a disaster in waiting. Initially intended to number 15,000 soldiers, it is barely reaching 5,700. At the same time, countries like France are balking at sending additional troops to bolster the promised numbers. Understaffed and guided by an unclear mandate, UNIFIL troops are unwilling to tame Hezbollah. Proof for this proposition comes from a recent episode, wherein Spanish troops stood down at the mere sight of Hezbollah fighters. One of the Spanish patrol leaders explained that UNIFIL’s role was only to “observe changes in behavior of the local population.”
On top of that, no UNIFIL patrols are carried out at night, for safety reasons. UN soldiers, feeling that they are increasingly viewed by the local population as an occupation force, are more interested in leaving than confronting Hezbollah: they are clearly worried about potential Hezbollah terror attacks. Such an attack would mirror the terrorist group’s October 1983 bombing, which killed 241 U.S. troops and 58 French troops. A few months later, multinational forces were gone. This time, the strategy appears to be preemptive retreat: A European diplomat was recently quoted as saying that, after an attack on UNIFIL, international forces would be gone within three days.
To sum up the situation: the Lebanese Army is watching UNIFIL watching Hezbollah. Thus it is far from surprising that Hezbollah is fast rearming through Syria, right under the nose of UNIFIL troops and the Lebanese Army, a fact confirmed by U.N. Special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen. But while UNIFIL does not seem particularly concerned with Hezbollah’s buildup, it is focusing on Israel’s violations of Lebanese airspace. Significantly, however, these incursions occur because Israel is compelled to fulfill UNIFIL’s mandate, which is to arrest -- and not simply to observe -- Hezbollah’s rearmament. France in particular has threatened to punish Israel while permitting Hezbollah to operate with impunity.
No one should be surprised that even French President Chirac is now counting on a maximum of four to five months of calm for the region. A likely scenario includes Hezbollah again controlling South Lebanon and launching attacks against Israel. This could be accelerated if Syria succeeds in igniting a civil war by pushing Hezbollah and its Shiite allies, including Christian General Aoun, towards a major confrontation with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the March 14 Forces, a coalition of political parties headed by Saad Hariri, the son of Lebanon’s assassinated prime minister Rafik Hariri. The recent resignation of Shiite ministers from the Siniora government is the first sign of this process. In the worst-case scenario, the chaos could reach Western shores if Hezbollah decides, on the orders of Iran, to start a terror campaign in the West or against Western targets, as it did in France in 1986.
In the meantime, one thing seems clear. This summer’s Israel-Hezbollah standoff marked not the end of a conflict but the beginning of a broader war that seems likely to reignite before long.
Olivier Guitta is a Washington DC based foreign affairs consultant. ----------------- Why Israel will go to war again – soon
By John Keegan
There will soon be another war in the Middle East, this time a renewal of the conflict between the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and Hizbollah. The conflict is inevitable and unavoidable. It will come about because Israel cannot tolerate the rebuilding of Hizbollah's fortified zone in south Lebanon, from which last year it launched its missile bombardment of northern Israel.
Hizbollah has now reconstructed the fortified zone and is replenishing its stocks of missiles there. Hamas is also creating a fortified zone in the Gaza Strip and building up its stocks of missiles. Israel, therefore, faces missile attack on two fronts. When the Israel general staff decides the threat has become intolerable, it will strike.
What happened in south Lebanon earlier this year has been widely misunderstood, largely because the anti-Israel bias in the international media led to the situation being misreported as an Israeli defeat. advertisement
It was no such thing. It was certainly an Israeli setback, but the idea that the IDF had suddenly lost its historic superiority over its Arab enemies and that they had acquired military qualities that had hitherto eluded them was quite false. Hizbollah suffered heavy losses in the fighting, perhaps as many as 1,000 killed out of its strength of up to 5,000 and it is only just now recovering.
What allowed Hizbollah to appear successful was its occupation of the bunker-and-tunnel system that it had constructed since June 2000, when the IDF gave up its presence in south Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982.
Although the IDF had got into south Lebanon, the casualties it had suffered in entering the fortified zone had alarmed the government and high command, since Israel's tiny population is acutely vulnerable to losses in battle. Israel's plan was to destroy Hizbollah's tunnels and bunkers, but the sending of a United Nations intervention force did not allow the destruction to be completed before the IDF was forced to withdraw.
Tunnel systems have played a crucial part in many modern campaigns, without attracting much attention. That is a serious oversight. The success of the Viet Cong in sustaining its war effort in Vietnam in 1968-72 depended heavily on its use of the so-called War Zone B, a complex of deep tunnels and underground bases north of Saigon, which had been begun during the war against the French in 1946-55.
War Zone B provided the Viet Cong with a permanent base of refuge and resupply that proved effectively invulnerable even against a determined American effort to destroy it. War Zone B has now become a major tourist attraction to Western visitors to Vietnam.
In its time, however, War Zone B was very far from being a holiday facility: it assured the survival of the Viet Cong close to Saigon and their ability to mount operations against the government forces and the Americans. Hizbollah, either by mimicry or on its own account, has now begun to employ a tunnel and underground base strategy against Israel. It was for that reason it was able to confront Israeli armoured forces in south Lebanon earlier this year.
The adoption of a tunnel strategy has allowed Hizbollah to wage asymmetric warfare against Israel's previously all-conquering armoured forces. The tunnel system is also impervious to attack by the Israeli Air Force.
Since Israel's reason for existence is to provide a secure base for the Jewish people, and that of the IDF is to act as their shield and safeguard – functions that have been carried out with high success since 1948 – it is obvious that neither can tolerate a zone of invulnerability occupied by a sworn enemy located directly on Israel's northern border.
It is therefore an easy prediction to foresee that the IDF will – at some time in the near future – reopen its offensive against Hizbollah in south Lebanon and will not cease until it has destroyed the underground system, even if, in the process, it inflicts heavy damage on the towns and villages of the region.
It is likely that it will also move against the underground system being constructed in the Gaza Strip. Hamas resupplies itself with arms and munitions brought from Egypt through those channels. Gaza is a softer target than south Lebanon, since it is an enclave that Israel easily dominates.
Indeed, the IDF may attack Gaza as a distraction from south Lebanon in an effort to make Hizbollah divide its forces and efforts.
Destroying the underground military facilities may be straightforward, but it is likely to create diplomatic complexities, particularly with the UN. Entering south Lebanon risks provoking a clash with Unifil, the major part of whose strength is provided by France. It is unlikely that such a risk will deter Israel. When national survival is at risk, Israel behaves with extreme ruthlessness. It attacked an American communications ship during the Six-Day War because it objected to America listening in to its most secret signals.
The big question hanging over an Israeli return to south Lebanon is whether that would provoke a war with Syria, Lebanon's Arab protector. The answer is quite possibly yes, but that such an extension of hostilities might prove welcome both to Israel and to the United States, which regards Syria as Iran's advanced post on the Mediterranean shore.
What is certain is that – probably before the year is out – Israel will have struck at Hizbollah in south Lebanon. And the strike will come even sooner if Hizbollah reopens its missile bombardment of northern Israel from its underground systems.
Ruego al cielo que no me toque un dios que la tenga muy grande.
ReplyDeletePuede ser que haya un Islam liberal. Después de todo el Islamismo o Islamofascismo no es una religión sino una ideologís basada en una religión para combatir a Occidente.El problema es que estos extremistas chantajean al resto de los musulmanes.
ReplyDeleteDe todas maneras, la falta de convicción de Europa para defender a su civilización más el indiscutible y creciente desbalance demográfico en favor de los musulmanes invita a ser pesimista. Frente a la barbarie medieval del islamismo por el momento sólo quedan EEUU e Israel (En menor medida Australia y otros países).
La semana pasada les envié un artículo del gran historiador militar británico John Keegan que sostiene que otra guerra en el Líbano es inevitable y llega a vaticinar que es probable que antes de fin de año Israel tenga que golpear a Hezbollah en el Sur del Líbano.
Quiero transcribir también un artículo de hoy en Frontpage Magazine en el que Olivier Guitta dice que la UNIFIL se limita a ver como Hezbollah se rearma impunemete, por ello también sostiene que otra guerra es inevitable
Transcribo los dos artículos
Countdown to Conflict
By Olivier Guitta
FrontPageMagazine.com | November 22, 2006
In the wake of this summer’s bloody, 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel, most analysts predicted that the region would never be the same. In fact, they asserted that with UN Resolution 1701, Hezbollah would be disarmed and expelled from its redoubt in southern Lebanon. This in turn would give effective control of the region to the Lebanese Army, while a UNIFIL force 15,000-men strong would secure the cease-fire and put an end to the armed conflict.
But the present reality is far from this rosy picture. Indeed, one can make the case that this summer’s hostilities have achieved little and that another war will resume in the near future.
A few prescient facts confirm this grim assessment. First, there is the anti-Israel composition of the Lebanese army. Forty percent of the 60,000-strong Lebanese army is composed of Shiite soldiers, many whom are extremely favorable to Hezbollah. There are also thousands of ex-Syrian troops, who joined the Lebanese Army when Syria “officially” left Lebanon last year, just before the Syrian withdrawal, when thousands of Syrian soldiers were naturalized and incorporated into the ranks of the army.
UNIFIL is scarcely an improvement. On the contrary, it is a disaster in waiting. Initially intended to number 15,000 soldiers, it is barely reaching 5,700. At the same time, countries like France are balking at sending additional troops to bolster the promised numbers. Understaffed and guided by an unclear mandate, UNIFIL troops are unwilling to tame Hezbollah. Proof for this proposition comes from a recent episode, wherein Spanish troops stood down at the mere sight of Hezbollah fighters. One of the Spanish patrol leaders explained that UNIFIL’s role was only to “observe changes in behavior of the local population.”
On top of that, no UNIFIL patrols are carried out at night, for safety reasons. UN soldiers, feeling that they are increasingly viewed by the local population as an occupation force, are more interested in leaving than confronting Hezbollah: they are clearly worried about potential Hezbollah terror attacks. Such an attack would mirror the terrorist group’s October 1983 bombing, which killed 241 U.S. troops and 58 French troops. A few months later, multinational forces were gone. This time, the strategy appears to be preemptive retreat: A European diplomat was recently quoted as saying that, after an attack on UNIFIL, international forces would be gone within three days.
To sum up the situation: the Lebanese Army is watching UNIFIL watching Hezbollah. Thus it is far from surprising that Hezbollah is fast rearming through Syria, right under the nose of UNIFIL troops and the Lebanese Army, a fact confirmed by U.N. Special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen. But while UNIFIL does not seem particularly concerned with Hezbollah’s buildup, it is focusing on Israel’s violations of Lebanese airspace. Significantly, however, these incursions occur because Israel is compelled to fulfill UNIFIL’s mandate, which is to arrest -- and not simply to observe -- Hezbollah’s rearmament. France in particular has threatened to punish Israel while permitting Hezbollah to operate with impunity.
No one should be surprised that even French President Chirac is now counting on a maximum of four to five months of calm for the region. A likely scenario includes Hezbollah again controlling South Lebanon and launching attacks against Israel. This could be accelerated if Syria succeeds in igniting a civil war by pushing Hezbollah and its Shiite allies, including Christian General Aoun, towards a major confrontation with Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the March 14 Forces, a coalition of political parties headed by Saad Hariri, the son of Lebanon’s assassinated prime minister Rafik Hariri. The recent resignation of Shiite ministers from the Siniora government is the first sign of this process. In the worst-case scenario, the chaos could reach Western shores if Hezbollah decides, on the orders of Iran, to start a terror campaign in the West or against Western targets, as it did in France in 1986.
In the meantime, one thing seems clear. This summer’s Israel-Hezbollah standoff marked not the end of a conflict but the beginning of a broader war that seems likely to reignite before long.
Olivier Guitta is a Washington DC based foreign affairs consultant.
-----------------
Why Israel will go to war again – soon
By John Keegan
There will soon be another war in the Middle East, this time a renewal of the conflict between the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and Hizbollah. The conflict is inevitable and unavoidable. It will come about because Israel cannot tolerate the rebuilding of Hizbollah's fortified zone in south Lebanon, from which last year it launched its missile bombardment of northern Israel.
Hizbollah has now reconstructed the fortified zone and is replenishing its stocks of missiles there. Hamas is also creating a fortified zone in the Gaza Strip and building up its stocks of missiles. Israel, therefore, faces missile attack on two fronts. When the Israel general staff decides the threat has become intolerable, it will strike.
What happened in south Lebanon earlier this year has been widely misunderstood, largely because the anti-Israel bias in the international media led to the situation being misreported as an Israeli defeat.
advertisement
It was no such thing. It was certainly an Israeli setback, but the idea that the IDF had suddenly lost its historic superiority over its Arab enemies and that they had acquired military qualities that had hitherto eluded them was quite false. Hizbollah suffered heavy losses in the fighting, perhaps as many as 1,000 killed out of its strength of up to 5,000 and it is only just now recovering.
What allowed Hizbollah to appear successful was its occupation of the bunker-and-tunnel system that it had constructed since June 2000, when the IDF gave up its presence in south Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982.
Although the IDF had got into south Lebanon, the casualties it had suffered in entering the fortified zone had alarmed the government and high command, since Israel's tiny population is acutely vulnerable to losses in battle. Israel's plan was to destroy Hizbollah's tunnels and bunkers, but the sending of a United Nations intervention force did not allow the destruction to be completed before the IDF was forced to withdraw.
Tunnel systems have played a crucial part in many modern campaigns, without attracting much attention. That is a serious oversight. The success of the Viet Cong in sustaining its war effort in Vietnam in 1968-72 depended heavily on its use of the so-called War Zone B, a complex of deep tunnels and underground bases north of Saigon, which had been begun during the war against the French in 1946-55.
War Zone B provided the Viet Cong with a permanent base of refuge and resupply that proved effectively invulnerable even against a determined American effort to destroy it. War Zone B has now become a major tourist attraction to Western visitors to Vietnam.
In its time, however, War Zone B was very far from being a holiday facility: it assured the survival of the Viet Cong close to Saigon and their ability to mount operations against the government forces and the Americans. Hizbollah, either by mimicry or on its own account, has now begun to employ a tunnel and underground base strategy against Israel. It was for that reason it was able to confront Israeli armoured forces in south Lebanon earlier this year.
The adoption of a tunnel strategy has allowed Hizbollah to wage asymmetric warfare against Israel's previously all-conquering armoured forces. The tunnel system is also impervious to attack by the Israeli Air Force.
Since Israel's reason for existence is to provide a secure base for the Jewish people, and that of the IDF is to act as their shield and safeguard – functions that have been carried out with high success since 1948 – it is obvious that neither can tolerate a zone of invulnerability occupied by a sworn enemy located directly on Israel's northern border.
It is therefore an easy prediction to foresee that the IDF will – at some time in the near future – reopen its offensive against Hizbollah in south Lebanon and will not cease until it has destroyed the underground system, even if, in the process, it inflicts heavy damage on the towns and villages of the region.
It is likely that it will also move against the underground system being constructed in the Gaza Strip. Hamas resupplies itself with arms and munitions brought from Egypt through those channels. Gaza is a softer target than south Lebanon, since it is an enclave that Israel easily dominates.
Indeed, the IDF may attack Gaza as a distraction from south Lebanon in an effort to make Hizbollah divide its forces and efforts.
Destroying the underground military facilities may be straightforward, but it is likely to create diplomatic complexities, particularly with the UN. Entering south Lebanon risks provoking a clash with Unifil, the major part of whose strength is provided by France. It is unlikely that such a risk will deter Israel. When national survival is at risk, Israel behaves with extreme ruthlessness. It attacked an American communications ship during the Six-Day War because it objected to America listening in to its most secret signals.
The big question hanging over an Israeli return to south Lebanon is whether that would provoke a war with Syria, Lebanon's Arab protector. The answer is quite possibly yes, but that such an extension of hostilities might prove welcome both to Israel and to the United States, which regards Syria as Iran's advanced post on the Mediterranean shore.
What is certain is that – probably before the year is out – Israel will have struck at Hizbollah in south Lebanon. And the strike will come even sooner if Hizbollah reopens its missile bombardment of northern Israel from its underground systems.