El futuro de Europa

Hoy vi en Barcepundit este muy interesante artículo sobre lo que le espera a Europa en el siglo XXI, el que iba a ser “el siglo de Europa”. Una Europa unida, con el euro, iba a alcanzar y superar a EEUU en pocos años y la supremacía del “modelo europeo” iba a quedar establecida para siempre.

Como tantas otras ccosillas que se leen por ahí, al final parece que no es tan así la cosa. Me pregunto si se trata sólo de una cuestión demográfica. ¿Es irreversible la decadencia europea? ¿O dentro de unos años estaremos hablando de la declinación de EEUU y el auge de la Unión Europea?:

True, the achievements of the European welfare state had been remarkable. Americans can only dream about a 35-hour work week or five weeks of paid holidays a year. But the problem was that all those social-assistance programs were affordable only as long as substantial economic growth took place. The welfare state, over time, had become more and more expensive. People were living longer, and more pensions had to be allocated. Medical services became more and more expensive. With rising unemployment, more support had to be given to those out of work. The number of students has grown fivefold, tenfold, or more all over Europe since the end of the Second World War, and more funds had to be given to schools and universities. In brief, everything became more expensive, and there was an obvious limit to the level of taxation that could be imposed by governments. The tax rate reached 45 percent in France and Italy and even higher in some other European countries.

Finally, while the Europe of 15 nations had become a Europe of 25, it had not become a more closely knit union. On the contrary, the centrifugal trends had become stronger, as seen in the vote against a common European constitution, first in France and later in the Netherlands (both referendums in 2005). That came as a great surprise and shock to the Brussels Eurocrats, and also to a considerable part of the political class in Europe. The Continent seemed further than ever from a common foreign and defense policy. The earlier Euro-optimism gave way to a wave of pessimism, the expression not just of a changing mood but also of the belated realization that Europe faced enormous problems with which it had not yet come to terms: The issue at stake was not its emergence as the leading superpower, but its survival.

This, then, is the picture of Europe in the first decade of the new century. It is a picture of gradual decline. Future historians may well be at a loss to understand why the sorry state of affairs was realized only late in the day, despite the fact that all the major trends — demography, the stalling of the movement toward European unity, and the crisis of the welfare state — had appeared well before the turn of the century.