Más de Airbus

De Ramiro por mail. Más sobre la naturaleza de los problemas de Airbus, del WSJ de hoy:

Icarus Inc.

With the Concorde now mothballed or in museums, Airbus is fast becoming the current airborne testament to the hubris of state-led industrial policy in Europe. Driven as much by political ego as business sense, the aircraft maker flew for the sun only, like Icarus, to see its wings start to melt away.

The meltdown in the stock price of its parent company this week was dramatic, but no surprise. Markets don't like bad news, and Airbus has produced bushels of late. Wednesday's 26% drop, which shaved $6.3 billion from the market value of European Aeronautic Defense & Space Co. before rebounding some yesterday, came a day after Airbus announced that its superjumbo A380 won't be produced on schedule through 2010. Delays have plagued this marquee project.

Airlines are unhappy with Airbus's proposed A350, the competitor to Boeing's surprisingly popular 787 "Dreamliner," forcing the Europeans back to the drawing board, at significant cost. The EU taxpayer may, once again, pick up a big part of the bill through launch aid and other handouts, all for the glory of this "pan-European flagship." Any more state aid is likely to lead to another complaint against Airbus before the World Trade Organization in Geneva.

The troubles on the factory floor may not be as serious a problem down the road as the company's unwieldy -- and, on current evidence, unworkable -- management structure. Airbus was born of a French, German, British and Spanish government initiative. Its political patrons have kept their noses in the business since. No prize for guessing who does so more than any other. Last year President Jacques Chirac tried to install Airbus boss Noël Forgeard, who happens to be French, into the top job at EADS. The messy fight ended when a German executive was named to share the CEO job with him. Then this year EADS was pulled into France's scandal du jour, the murky "Clearstream affair," when Mr. Forgeard's former close aide admitted to supplying evidence (later declared a forgery) that linked leading politicians to corruption. Close ties to government can be a source of trouble, EADS learned, not just interest-free loans.

A fair conclusion, reached by the markets this week, is that an executive suite preoccupied with political mumbo-jumbo took its eyes off the superjumbo. With so much riding on the A380, the production glitches are a stunning indictment of management. The delays in delivering the plane will cost EADS $2.5 billion in 2007-2010. EADS yesterday launched a probe into the A380 program. The cost in terms of fines, canceled orders and lost future orders adds to the bill. The blow to prestige is far bigger.

It is instructive to note that Boeing itself was, only a few years ago, in a similar pickle. Two CEOs lost their jobs and a senior executive landed in jail, but Boeing got through painful restructuring, including deep job cuts, and made hard decisions (like refusing to fight Airbus for the A380 market) knowing that money was finite. Its updated product line is led by the "Dreamliner." Suddenly, Boeing is poised to dominate its market for years to come.

In its present guise Airbus, or EADS, looks ill-disposed to take this road. The dual management structure -- in fact an improvement on the previous consortium model -- makes the company, by nature, less flexible. So do its political links. State treasuries have been eager to build toys that boost national egos, to the tune of $15 billion in taxpayer handouts over the past three decades. The leaders of France, Britain, Spain and Germany were all on hand last year at the maiden flight of the A380. Financial realism was never a big part of the equation at Airbus. In return, the politicians expect the company to shun Anglo-Saxon-style restructuring.

No wonder that the big industrial shareholders are running for the doors. British Aerospace was right in the middle of negotiating to sell its 20% stake in Airbus back to EADS when the share price nosedived. France's Lagardere cut its stake in EADS in half, to 15%, in April. Germany's DaimlerChrylser, another big owner, is moving to do the same.

Tellingly, Airbus's fall from grace is portrayed as a blow to European pride rather than to the company's shareholders and millions of air travelers, who will suffer directly. This is the real trans-Atlantic gap. Americans tend to judge corporations by the bottom line, not the national flag. Europeans relate to big companies as to their World Cup teams. In this they get plenty of encouragement from politicians, in particular the Gallic variety, who think business is their business.

With a duopoly in aircraft manufacturing, we all benefit from having two healthy, competitive producers. Cut free from subsidies and politics, Airbus would be free to behave like a normal company. It is not that today.